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Abstract  
In this paper, I trace some of Ricoeur’s criticisms of Foucault in his major works on historiography, and 
evaluate them. I find that Ricoeur’s criticisms of Foucault’s archaeological project in Time and Narrative are 
not particularly worrisome, and that Foucault’s “critical” project actually provides alternatives for enriching 
and expanding on some of Ricoeur’s later insights in Memory, History, Forgetting and – in particular – for 
troubling the distinction made between critique and ontology. 
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Résumé 
Dans cet article, je passe en revue quelques unes des critiques ricoeuriennes de Foucault telles qu'on les 
trouve dans ses œuvres majeures sur l'historiographie, et je cherche à en évaluer la portée. Il me semble que 
les objections de Ricoeur à l'égard du projet archéologique de Foucault telles qu'elles apparaissent dans 
Temps et récit ne sont pas particulièrement inquiétantes, et ce projet «critique» de Foucault fournit en fait des 
alternatives pour enrichir et développer certaines des perspectives développées ultérieurement par Ricoeur 
dans La Mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli et - en particulier - pour mettre en question la distinction entre critique et 
ontologie. 
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Paul Ricoeur is not often regarded as one of the major figures of 20th century Continental 
Philosophy.2 This is in part a consequence of Ricoeur’s milieu, in which many thinkers were 
directing us to the startling limitations of the nevertheless inescapable metaphysical frameworks 
in which we find ourselves, or – if more optimistic – exhorting us to radically transform our 
epistemes. Ricoeur’s more conciliatory approach doesn’t immediately appear to have this same 
urgency, the sort that finds a thinker devoted disciples or antagonists. Even if Ricoeur always 
claimed to belong to the tradition of hermeneutic thought, and phenomenological hermeneutics 
more specifically, and thus often gave pride of place to such thought in his work, he remained 
committed to a synoptic project. As late as Memory, History, Forgetting, he took pains to 
incorporate the insights of many – from Plato and Aristotle, to the Annales school, Foucault and 
de Certeau, through to Reinhart Koselleck and Heidegger – into an overarching vision of what it 
means to be historical, to have a past that exceeds and shapes us, and yet have that past somehow 
available to us. Certainly, he arranges these thinkers in a hierarchy of sorts, but his aim is not to 
refute, undermine or deconstruct, but to thoughtfully delimit and, consequently, appropriate 
their claims. Ultimately, he aims to incorporate a phenomenology of remembrance into the 
discursive enterprise of historiography, as – contra Heidegger – “authentic” constituents of an 
ontology of historical human being, one that maintains the resources for the thoughtful self-
criticism integral to the project of historical self-understanding. Ricoeur’s final magnum opus is 
obviously ambitious.3  
However, to do justice to Ricoeur’s philosophy is not simply to rest content with his 
conciliatory gestures, but to examine them. One must place Ricoeur in an argumentative 
landscape, and address and evaluate the ways in which he engages his interlocutors. Despite 
Ricoeur’s repeated attempts to address himself to other thinkers and the questions they raised, 
there seems to be a remarkable lack of interest in taking up Ricoeur’s’s explicit engagements with 
other philosophers, such as Heidegger or Foucault. In this paper, I would like to contribute to 
remedying that situation, specifically with regard to the work of Foucault.4  
In Memory, History, Forgetting, Ricoeur gives an account of the hermeneutics of the 
historical condition. For Ricoeur, these hermeneutics are two-fold. First, a deep ontological 
hermeneutics of the human being in its relation to birth and death, of the existential structures in 
virtue of which human beings are “historical” at all. Second, a critical hermeneutics of the 
historical condition, aimed at explicating just how it is that we manage to situate and orient 
ourselves “within” history, and thus how it is we are able to make historical judgments about, 
and take responsibility for, events such as the Shoah. Ricoeur’s aim is to show, ultimately, that 
conceptual categories for understanding history fall short, and that an existential, or ontological 
engagement with “historicity” is fundamental.5  
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In the same volume, Ricoeur engages with the work of Michel Foucault. However, his 
engagement is restricted to the methodological and epistemological challenges he takes 
Foucault’s historical method to raise for the practice of historiography; for Ricoeur, even if these 
are important, the ontological hermeneutics of historical consciousness precede and make them 
possible. Foucault’s challenge, according to Ricoeur, is simply not radical. Foucault, on the other 
hand, described his own work as, alternatively, “historical ontology,” and “a critical ontology of 
the present, and of our selves.” As far as he was concerned, there were no strict demarcations to 
make between critique, ontology, and historiography.   
With these issues in mind, I would like to continue the nascent dialogue between Ricoeur 
and Foucault on the relations between these three notions: critique, ontology, and history. It is 
my hope that such a dialogue will be of use to contemporary philosophers in precisely the areas 
with which Ricoeur was concerned: that by getting a better sense of how we come to be beings 
with the history we have, we might have a better a sense of how it is that we are supposed to go 
on. In the following, I argue that Ricoeur’s objections to Foucault fail to find their mark, and that 
in fact Foucault’s notion of an “historical ontology of the present” constitutes a complementary 
strategy to the critical and ontological hermeneutics of historical experience presented in Memory, 
History, Forgetting. I defend Foucault from Ricoeur’s characterisation in Time and Narrative, and 
give an outline of Foucault’s critical-ontological project that avoids too-easy divisions of his work 
into alleged “archaeological” and “genealogical” periods.6 I then present some of Ricoeur’s goals 
in Memory, History, Forgetting, and some aspects of Foucault’s work where Ricoeur’s criticisms 
would be most likely to be effective. However, these criticisms do not gain any traction either. I 
conclude by sketching the stakes of a confrontation between Ricoeur and Foucault and 
suggesting directions for integrating their thought.  
To begin, let us turn to Time and Narrative, where Ricoeur first responds to Foucault, 
before briefly developing an interpretation of Foucault responsive to these objections, and finally 
show how the two thinkers might be able to work together in articulating the relations between 
critique, ontology, and history. In Time and Narrative, Ricoeur attempts to develop a coherent 
account of historical experience under the heading of the “hermeneutics of historical 
consciousness.” He borrows from Reinhart Koselleck the twin notions of the “space of 
experience” and the “horizon of expectations” and puts them to use as transcendental categories.7 
That is to say, for Ricoeur, these are constitutive organizing concepts for thinking about history 
and historical experience as we now have it; we experience historical time – I will simply use the 
term “history” – as a collective singular: we experience it. And, beyond the horizon of the present 
(whose borders are never exactly clear) we project our collective possibilities, our expectations, in 
such a way that the historical present becomes intelligible to us. But the horizon of expectations – 
quite clearly isomporphic to the projection of future possibilities in and through which the 
singular Dasein temporalizes itself – stands in a reciprocal relation to the “space of experience.” 
Unsurprisingly, it seems that the space of experience is supposed to be the collective analogue to 
the thrownness of the singular Dasein. That is, the individual human being finds herself always 
already in a meaningful world, such that the things she encounters are immediately intelligible to 
her on the basis of her tacit, prejudicial understanding of the world. At the historical level, the 
level of the collective singular that surpasses any given human individual, we contemporaries 
share a common, if anonymous, historical present in virtue of the fact that we project a horizon of 
expectation into the historical future, and we can only do this because we already find a vast 
range of experience available to us, that is, we are connected to an historical past that we take as 
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ours, in which we find ourselves more or less at home (though of course not without our 
misgivings and our criticisms and our doubts); it is on the basis of a past that we more or less 
unproblematically understand as ours that we are able to project coherent expectations into the 
historical future. These metahistorical/transcendental concepts, the space of experience and the 
horizon of expectation, in turn subtend further “transcendentals for thinking about history.”  
It is at this point that Ricoeur turns his attention to the notion of tradition. Ricoeur notes 
that “tradition” has (at least) three distinct senses; I shall be concerned presently with the first of 
these. Tradition, in this primary sense, can also be considered as a formal/transcendental feature 
of our thought about history; to avoid confusion, we will call it traditionality. Taken in this sense, 
traditionality, as Ricoeur puts it, “signifies that the temporal distance separating us from the past 
is not a dead interval but a transmission that is generative of meaning.”8 We might put it like this: 
tradition – in this formal sense – is a transcendental structure of the experience of “historical 
time,” in which temporal distance is not simply an empty container to be filled with events, or a 
continuous segment of linear instances. Rather, this distance makes possible meaning and 
understanding; it enables a trans-mission, a giving over. It is in virtue of this traditionality that we 
have a space of experience, that the world in which we live is familiar to us.  
So, traditionality is also transcendental category for thinking about history. We are not 
simply living bodies occupying positions in the physical time of the cosmos, nor isolated selves 
experiencing the passage of lived time, but are a collective singular that belongs to a tradition, 
and see ourselves as such. The present as a “today” in collective life can be so because we are 
linked by tradition from meaningful past to a meaningful future. And it is traditionality as both the 
connection to and distance from the past that makes this thinkable.  
 For Ricoeur, then, the hermeneutics of historical consciousness, which one might also 
describe as the explication of the experience of historical time, relies basically on three categories: 
the space of experience, the horizon of expectation, and traditionality. In terms of these three 
categories, we can articulate the coherent experience of historical time, insofar as they allow us to 
bring together the phenomena of contemporaries, successors, and predecessors with the 
succession of generations, and further tie these to the institution of calendar time, thereby linking 
our individual experience of time to that of the cosmos.  
 In order to discuss how Michel Foucault fits into the discourse of Time and Narrative, I 
need to turn to the two derivative senses of tradition that Ricoeur also discusses. Beyond the 
transcendental category of tradition/traditionality, there are the various concrete traditions in 
which one might find oneself, with their various materials, practices, canonical texts, and so forth. 
And, lastly, there is tradition in the sense of traditional authority, taken as the point of contention 
in the debate carried on by Habermas, in the name of critical theory, against Gadamer and his 
hermeneutically-minded followers. In broad strokes, the critique runs as follows: traditional 
authority is not always legitimate authority, and is often the effect of (perceived or unperceived) 
coercive, dominating power and, further, if this sort of authority plays a role in constituting the 
concrete traditions to which we belong, then these traditions themselves should be reformed or 
rejected in order to respect modern demands for legitimacy. Critical vigilance, with respect to the 
sources of tradition and their actual maintenance, should therefore be exercised.  
Ricoeur very self-consciously avoids embroiling himself in this debate; his point, rather, 
is to make clear that the Habermasian critique of traditional authority does not invalidate the use 
of traditionality as a metahistorical, or transcendental, category for explicating the possibility of 
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historical consciousness. Rather, the two co-exist and – as we might expect from Ricoeur – the 
critical moment is subordinated to the hermeneutic. As he puts it, though suspicion of ideology 
contaminates every claim to truth that a tradition might make, “this criticism [of traditions] is just 
one variant in the style of traditionality.”9 
  It is telling that, though Habermas carried on his own polemic with Foucault, Ricoeur 
nevertheless assimilates the latter’s archaeology to the same sceptical camp as the critics of 
ideology.10 The first reference to Foucault in Time and Narrative appears during Ricoeur’s 
epistemological discussion of archives and documents. Archives and documents are the 
fundamental resource of the historian; documents are the preserved traces of our predecessors, 
their meaningfulness allowing us to reconstitute the world in which they lived. Part of Ricoeur’s 
purpose, here, is to defend historical research against overzealous criticism by those who – like 
the critics of ideology – would be inclined to see in every document, every preserved trace of the 
past, not the presentation of a truth but the effects of power. He names Jacques Le Goff and 
Foucault as those who would remind us that, often, documents are monuments, that is, the 
institutionalized memorials of society’s ruling class. Ricoeur takes this to mean that, as above, 
critical vigilance must be exercised by the historian.11 And in a footnote, Ricoeur cites Foucault: 
The document is not the fortunate tool of a history that is fundamentally and primarily 
memory: history is one way in which society recognizes and develops a mass of 
documentation with which it is inextricably linked.12 
In Time and Narrative, then, Ricoeur construes Foucault’s fundamental challenge as an 
epistemological one, a critical-sceptical challenge to the alleged ability of documents to present 
truths about the past. Or, more precisely, Ricoeur thinks Foucault’s challenge arises when one 
tries to turn from the epistemology of the past as manifest in the practice of the historian, to an 
ontological investigation of the historical condition:  
What is ultimately at stake in this discussion is the apparent antinomy between 
discontinuity and continuity in history. We can speak of an antinomy here insofar as, on 
the one hand, it is the very reception of the historical past that seems to require the 
continuity of a common memory, and because, on the other hand, the documentary 
revolution brought about by the new history seems to make breaks, ruptures, crises, and 
the irruption of changes in thinking – in short, discontinuity – prevail… It is in Michel 
Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge that this antinomy receives its most rigorous 
formulation, while at the same time it is resolved in terms of the second alternative [i.e. 
discontinuity]. 
   
On the one side, the asserted privilege of discontinuity is associated with a new discipline, 
the archaeology of knowledge, which does not coincide with the history of ideas as 
historians usually understand this. On the other side, the contested privilege of continuity 
is associated with the ambition of a constituting consciousness and the 
mastery of meaning.13 
On Ricoeur’s reading, Focault’s endeavour seems to illegitimately cross the 
ontological/epistemological divide; it appears as if Foucault is drawing an ontological 
consequence – the denial of anything like a constituting consciousness that would underlie the 
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continuity of history – from epistemological developments in the field of historiography. And 
Ricoeur’s response is simply to note, again, that these developments are entirely legitimate. The 
actual practice of the archaeology of knowledge – in, for example, The Birth of the Clinic and The 
Order of Things – is enough to validate an approach to history that prioritizes the “subterranean” 
ruptures and discontinuities between apparently continuous sciences and practices. But Ricoeur, 
ever the mediator, is not willing to grant that this undermines the basic continuity of 
traditionality, nor that the continuity of traditionality implies anything about a “constituting 
consciousness.” For him, the continuity of tradition outstrips any individual memory, making 
possible the development of a collective “memory” (that is not “consciousness” in anything but a 
metaphorical sense), insofar as it allows the past to appear intelligibly to us, insofar as the past 
can “speak to us” through those meaning-generative traces documented and kept in archives.  
 As mentioned, whatever differences there might be between Habermas and Foucault – 
and, at the very least, Habermas thinks that there are many – Ricoeur takes them both to be 
raising epistemological challenges to tradition: the former to its normative authority, the latter to 
the continuity of traditional narratives. And, indeed, when almost 20 years later, in Memory, 
History, Forgetting Ricoeur readdresses these same themes, he will explicitly divide his 
investigations into three distinct – though interrelated – sections: the phenomenology of memory, 
the epistemology of historiography, and the hermeneutics of the historical condition. And, in this 
later work, Ricoeur’s only explicit engagement with Foucault takes place in the second, explicitly 
epistemological section.   
 The point to be drawn here is this: though in Time and Narrative, and beyond, Ricoeur 
is more than willing to countenance epistemological critique, both in the anodyne sense of 
submitting knowledge-claims to critical scrutiny and the stronger sense of critiquing the authority 
of scientificity, he has a very difficult time finding a space to locate “critique” in a radical sense. 
Because of his commitment to an original ontological “belonging” to history, a commitment to 
traditionality in its deepest sense, there can be no radical critique, no total rejection of the 
everyday, no position from which one might grasp an “undistorted” view of the totality (of 
history, of society, of Nature, of whatever). This originary belonging – the object of the 
“ontological hermeneutics” of the historical condition – is a consequence of our finitude, but in 
the positive sense that having a limited perspective is a positive condition of having any 
perspective at all.14 This will become manifest in his discussion of critique and ontology in 
Memory, History, Forgetting, to which we will return later.  
Towards the very end of his life, Foucault described his own project as an “historical 
ontology of ourselves.”15 I would like to turn now to reconstructing that project, in order to see 
whether and how it might exceed Ricoeur’s epistemological characterization and, further, might 
contribute to the latter’s own project. This reconstruction – which will be all too brief – will focus 
on the explicit discussions provided in the 1984 essay “What is Enlightenment?” and his 1978 
lecture “What is Critique?” The 1978 lecture anticipates a great deal of the essay, culminating in 
the closing statement that Foucault had originally intended to entitle it “What is Enlightenment?” 
I will also draw on some of the “meta-ethical” statements he makes in the introductory sections 
of The Use of Pleasure. The opening lectures of Foucault’s 1983 course at the College de France on 
The Government of Self and Others contain, almost verbatim, the bulk of the material presented in 
the Enlightenment essay; given that Foucault was simultaneously preparing the materials for 
publication that would become the last two volumes of The History of Sexuality, I take this to be (at 
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least minimal) textual evidence for reading Foucault’s late “ethical” works against the backdrop 
of his thought about Enlightenment.  
In each of these “Enlightenment” works, Foucault links the spirit of his project to Kant. 
First of all, Foucault places his own project in the framework of the Kantian notion that 
Enlightenment is humankind’s “exit” or “way out” from “immaturity” to “maturity,” by linking 
it to his own thought on governmentality and self-government. While I cannot in this paper fully 
explicate Foucault’s complicated (and perhaps indeterminate) conception of governmentality, I 
can provide a quick sketch of how I think the concept evolves in his thought from 1978 to 1984.  
 The concept of “government,” or of “governmentality,” arises in Foucault’s work 
while he trying to explain the genesis and nature of bio-politics, in particular in his lectures at the 
College de France in the mid- to late-70s, and it occupied him to some degree until the year of his 
death. Recapitulating the history of bio-politics, in which “governmentality” takes conceptual 
shape, would take us far beyond the scope of this paper. But the basic idea is this: government is 
the “conduct of conduct,” the manner in which one conducts oneself, the ultimate form given, by 
oneself or another, to one’s life, to one’s subjectivity. As he describes subjectivity in The Care of the 
Self, the subject is not something substantively pre-given, from the features of which one could 
draw any important normative conclusions about how to concretely live one’s life. Rather, the 
existence of an ethical subject requires an individual (say, a concrete human being) to be 
determined (or “subjected”) in various ways:  
1. The ethical substance of the individual must be determined; it must be determined 
just which part of her is subject to norms, and the sorts of things for which she is 
to be responsible.  
 
2. Further, the form of ethical work required by subjectivity must be determined. 
Must, for example, the subject constantly survey her will in order to make sure 
that it accords with the moral code, or is all that is required for her proper ethical 
conduct a sort of conversion experience?  
 
3. There must be a moral code, with respect to which the subject can determine her 
standing, and make adjustments as need be (though, for Foucault, moral codes 
are generally the least interesting determining factor with respect to ethical 
subjectivity).  
 
4. The mode of subjection of the individual must be determined. Why and how does 
she do the sort of ethical work on the sort of ethical substance that she does? 
Because she is a spiritual being subject to the law of a Divine Creator? Because 
she is a certain species of living organism subject to various functional norms? 
Because she is an autonomous being capable of responding to the demands of 
reason? Or because she is a proud member of a long tradition of certain spiritual 
practices? And does she carry this work out reflectively? Or completely 
unwittingly? If the former, is she joyful, begrudging, or almost thoughtless in the 
discharge of the ethical tasks assigned to her?  
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5. The ethical telos, the goal to which the individual aspires (though not necessarily 
exhaustive – or perhaps even a component – of the mode of subjection). This 
could be state of spiritual purity, the maximization of total human utility, etc.16  
It is quite reasonable to think that the determination of these five dimensions of ethical 
subjectivity amounts to the conduct of one’s conduct, which Foucault elsewhere talks about in 
terms of one’s mode of being. There is an explicit ontological dimension to Foucault’s ethics, as to 
govern is to determine the mode of being of an individual, to determine it in its very subjectivity.  
And it is not without reason that Foucault begins his lecture course on The Government of 
Self and Others by discussing Kant’s essay.17 There are ways in which others can govern one, and 
ways in which one can govern oneself. Foucault, clearly, shares with Kant the aim of autonomy, in 
the sense of self-government, at the very least in the minimal sense in thinking for oneself, of 
“exiting” from having one’s conduct conducted by others. For Kant, to be autonomous is to 
comply with the demands of reason, at least partially because they are the demands of reason; it 
might be the case that the edicts of an enlightened despot are in accord with the demands of 
reason, and yet to comply with those demands simply because they are the edicts of one’s ruler, or 
simply because we fear the consequences of doing otherwise, would be heteronomous. And, thus, 
for him, Enlightenment, or the “escape” of humanity from its self-incurred immaturity to 
maturity is, first of all, a matter of determining the limits of knowledge, that is, determining the 
limits of the permissible and impermissible use of reason and, second, of reflectively acting in 
accord with reason within its permissible limits. And this Kantian Enlightenment heritage has, 
Foucault thinks, been taken up in various ways by thinkers from Marx through Weber to the 
Frankfurt School; to the extent that Foucault also shares a Kantian heritage, his work has a 
kinship with these thinkers.  
 Nevertheless, Foucault’s work diverges in important ways from Kant and his German 
heirs. While he can appreciate the attempt to discern legitimate from illegitimate uses of reason, 
and hence legitimate from illegitimate uses of power, such a project is orthogonal to his interests. 
Rather, as Foucault sees it, there isn’t anything like a singular rationality or Reason; rather, there 
are and have been various rationalities.18 The basic idea is this: in more or less Kantian fashion, the 
world and the things in it underdetermine the sorts of judgments we make about it. In addition, 
there are rules – that need not, often are not, and in some cases perhaps cannot be accessed by 
consciousness – that govern the judgments that we are able to make, to the extent that they 
establish which statements are candidates for truth and falsity in the first place.19 And, again in 
more or less Kantian fashion, insofar as there are rules governing our judgments, these rules 
determine the objects about which can judge. However, Foucault is sceptical of taking these rules 
as timeless, necessary or in any sense innate. His wager, with respect to his archaeological 
investigations, is that he can delineate and distinguish different epistemes, an episteme being 
something like the domain(s) of knowledge governed by a certain set of rules or principles for a 
specific period of time. It is Foucault’s claim that the Classical episteme, for example, encompassed 
the sciences of natural history, general grammar, and the analysis of wealth, while the modern 
episteme encompassed the sciences of political economy, biology and philology. The latter cannot 
be seen as the continuation or development of the former insofar as it is governed by different 
rules or principles and hence has new objects: life, labour and language, as studied by biology, 
political economy and philology, are objects that are constituted in the shift from one episteme to 
another. If archaeology in Foucault’s sense really can be carried out, its stakes are to show that 
there are rules underlying judgments in various domains and that these different domains can be 
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distinguished. This is the substance of the short descriptions he gives of “archaeology” in both 
“What is Critique?” and in The Government of Self and Others.  
 However, from Foucault’s perspective, this greatly complicates the task of autonomy, 
if we may call it that. If rationality, reasons, and meaning all emerge from the functioning of 
coercive structures (which we might simply call a set of rules), then the line between reason and 
power begins to blur. At the risk of oversimplifying, it doesn’t seem as if, on his view, one can 
clearly distinguish between rational norms and the effects of power, such that one could in any 
meaningful sense qualify as autonomous by only accepting those effects of power that conform to 
reflectively endorsed rational norms (or some variation on this theme). And, indeed, Foucault 
clearly states that analyzing knowledge and rationality in terms of power (or power/knowledge) 
is distinguished insofar as it “is a procedure that is unconcerned with legitimizing and 
consequently [excludes] the fundamental point of view of the law.”20 Etymology 
notwithstanding, autonomy will not be understood as a matter of self-legislation; so, then, to 
what could it amount?  
 As we have seen, autonomy will be two-sided, for Foucault. First of all, at least ideally, 
autonomy will be self-government. This is not necessarily the same as self-legislation. First of all, it 
cannot be a matter of accepting, endorsing, or acquiescing to only those exercises of power that 
are presently rationally justified.21 If we grant Foucault his archaeological method – as Ricoeur 
does – we grant him that different sets of rules have, at different points in time, constituted 
different rationalities and, further, we grant that these constitutive rules are themselves exercises 
of power. So, while Foucault certainly wouldn’t want to qualify properly autonomous 
comportment as simply “irrational,” nevertheless, such comportment won’t be essentially 
characterized in terms of its rationality. Indeed, part of determining oneself as an ethical subject, 
as a subject at all, means actually determining the sorts of reasons to which one will be 
responsive, that is, which sorts of reasons will be good reasons (or, maybe, will count as reasons 
at all).  
 On the other hand, autonomy becomes simultaneously a matter of history (and 
historiography) and a matter of practice, “a historico-practical test of the limits that we may go 
beyond, and thus… work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings.”22 Given that 
different rationalities, epistemes, regimes of power/knowledge, have prevailed at different points 
in history, and that we ourselves have been “born into” such regimes, the task of autonomy will 
require, precisely, seeing just what aspects of our current regimes are not universal or necessary, 
but are rather singular or contingent. We work on ourselves, thereby, by experimenting with our 
selves, by attempting to alter (some) contingent determinations of our subjectivity that are 
revealed to us as such.  
 I should point out here, that on this “continuist” reading of Foucault, there is no 
“methodological failure” of archaeology or a deep rift between it and genealogy.23 Archaeology 
does not critique prior constitutive norms for knowledge, but only brings them to light; 
genealogy attempts to highlight not just how “false” or “ideological” forms of purported 
knowledge are supported by relations of power, but how those constitutive norms for knowledge 
as such are part and parcel of social systems of power; this is the upshot of moving from 
analysing “rationality” as opposed to power, to “rationalities” embedded in power-relations. 
While Ricoeur’s engagement with Foucault is not to be criticised for following a traditional 
pattern of separating archaeology from genealogy and engaging them as different projects, the 
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reading I develop here, in the light of resources that Ricoeur obviously could not have had, works 
to block that move.24  
It should, I think, be clear by now that, contra Ricoeur, Foucault’s critical project should 
not be assimilated to the critique of ideology. He is uninterested in distinguishing the rational, or 
legitimate, uses of power from the illegitimate. His historical project is, to speak somewhat 
misleadingly, more descriptive than evaluative in this regard, a type of analysis of power, including 
rationality. So, Ricoeur misunderstands when he cites Foucault on documents and monuments. 
Foucault is not concerned with revealing the distorting effects of power on documents that are 
otherwise expressions of meaning, traces of meaningful work and ciphers of past worlds, but 
rather with specifying those rules of discourse and rationalities that, qua effects of power, allow 
documents to appear as meaningful in the first place. To this extent, Foucault seems at least in 
broad agreement with Ricoeur regarding “positive” finitude; though the constraints that 
constitute epistemes, scientific objects, and scientific knowledge may rule other discourses out, it is 
only in virtue of such rules that we objects and knowledge of them at all.   It thus strikes me that 
Ricoeur’s remarks on Foucault in Time and Narrative fail to get at the substance of Foucault’s 
project. At any rate, the concept of traditionality, or a debate over continuity or discontinuity in 
history, or indeed over “ideology,” and its critique, no longer seems the point of contention 
between Ricoeur and Foucault.  
Indeed, in Memory, History, Forgetting, divided – much like Time and Narrative – into 
separate discussions of the epistemology of historiography and the hermeneutics of the historical 
condition, the theme of traditionality gets more or less dropped from Ricoeur’s investigation. 
While he may still hold that traditionality is a transcendental category for historical thinking, it 
no longer plays any major role in his discussion. In Memory, History, Forgetting, the hermeneutics 
of the historical condition is divided into two distinct sections, one “critical” and one 
“ontological.” The latter is an engagement with Martin Heidegger over the relation between 
historicity and authenticity. In the former section, “critical philosophy of history” is, again, not a 
matter of substantive positive claims, but merely the paying of close attention to the sorts of 
grounds provided for certain totalizing claims. Ricoeur again draws heavily from Koselleck, this 
time not in order to explicate the conditions of possibility of historical thinking, but to guard 
against the presumptions of both speculative philosophies of history claiming to discern the 
meaning of history and various manifestations of the “modernist” tendency to declare and 
valourize the discovery of a clear break between “their” time and the rest of history. This 
discussion comes right before his inquiry into the various similarities and dissimilarities between 
the respective tasks of the judge and the historian and the role of interpretation in historiography, 
which serves as the transition from “critical” to “ontological” hermeneutics. And it is precisely at 
this point, I want to suggest, that the real engagement between Ricoeur and Foucault might take 
place, on the border between ontology and critique.  
Ricoeur wants to problematize the “modernist” desire “to say in what times we live… Or 
to express our difference and novelty in relation to every other age.”25 His goal is to show the 
“controversial, polemical inconclusive nature of all discussions on the ‘true’ sense of ‘our’ 
modernity.”26 And his strategy is to trace the development of the terms “modern” and 
“modernity,” demonstrating that the “modern” is not so modern, and its evaluative connotations 
simply a (relatively) recent permutation in the history of this concept.  
 And, one might think, this is exactly where Ricoeur would want to confront Foucault. 
Isn’t Foucault’s “critical ontology of the present” precisely a discourse on the “sense of ‘our’ 
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modernity,” one that would uncover the events that underlie the shift between the epochs of the 
past and ours? So, then, shouldn’t Foucault be a primary target of Ricoeur’s critique? He is very 
explicit about finding something novel in Kant’s thoughts about Enlightenment and its relation to 
history, in how Kant links the task of “exiting” from immaturity to both historical reflection on 
the nature of the present and to explicit critical reflection on the relationship between reason and 
authority; the question he takes over from Kant is “What difference does today introduce with 
respect to yesterday?”27 Foucault’s explicit borrowing from and inspiration by Kant shows that 
even the construction of an historical present, of a concept of an historical now that would be 
distinguished from the past, often relies on a continuity with the past that would undermine any 
claim to radical novelty. To the extent that Ricoeur wants to reconcile “discontinuist” and 
“continuist” approaches to (philosophy of) history, Foucault seems especially suspect here, both 
claiming that his project rests on a characteristically “modern” attitude and nevertheless staking 
his archaeological work on the claim to uncover the fundamental discontinuities between 
different regimes of power/knowledge. 
These, I take it, are the points where Ricoeur might come into genuine conflict with 
Foucault: these are where, if anywhere, his worries might find some bite, some traction. But, I 
contend, such objections still miss the mark; this does not mean that Ricoeur’s work needs to be 
rejected, but rather that Foucault shows us a new and different direction in which to take it.   
First of all, for Foucault, the “modernity” in which he is interested is not a set of beliefs, 
of institutional structures, or anything that could be temporally circumscribed in that way. While 
“modernity” might be, in some respects, either the era of the individual or of the “iron cage,” 
Foucault is not primarily interested in modernity as itself an historical category. Rather, what he 
finds in Kant – and, interestingly, in Baudelaire – is a modern attitude, an ethos, as he calls it in 
“What is Enlightenment?” (In “What is Critique?” Foucault refers to a specifically modern-critical 
determination of the will, a “decision-making will not to be governed.”)28: 
I know that modernity is often spoken of as an epoch, or at least as a set of features 
characteristic of an epoch; situated on a calendar, it would be preceded by a more or less 
naïve or archaic premodernity, and followed by an enigmatic and troubling 
“postmodernity.” And then we find ourselves asking whether modernity constitutes the 
sequel to the Enlightenment and its development, or whether we are to see it as a rupture 
or a deviation with respect to the basic principles of the Eighteenth Century… Thinking 
back on Kant’s text, I wonder whether we may not envisage modernity rather as an 
attitude than a period of history. And by “attitude,” I mean a mode of relating to 
contemporary reality.29 
In other words, Foucault does not seek to tell us just what the nature of “modernity” is, as 
opposed to premodernity or postmodernity. The point, for Foucault, is not that there emerged, 
with “modernity” or with some period known as the Enlightenment, some set of institutions, or 
widely shared moral precepts or norms of moral reasoning, or some great disillusionment on the 
part of the subjects of political power, or some common “humanist” sensibility. We can remain 
agnostic about what constitutes modernity or Enlightenment as epochs, if there are such:  
Let us say, if you will, that it is not because we privilege the 18th century, because we are 
interested in it, that we encounter the problem of the Aufklärung. I would say instead that 
it is because we fundamentally want to ask the question, What is Aufklärung that we 
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encounter the historical scheme of our modernity. The point is not to say that the Greeks 
of the 5th century are little like the philosophers of the 18th or that the 12th century was 
already a kind of Renaissance, but rather to try to see under what conditions, at the cost of 
which modifications or generalizations we can apply this question of the Aufklärung to  
any moment in history…30 
For Foucault, to use Ricoeur’s language, the “conceptual” category of Enlightenment is also an 
ethical – indeed, an existential – category, a way of thinking about and embodying one’s ethos 
that, precisely, straddles the line between critique and ontology. Let us grant that Foucault is on 
to something when he shifts the discussion of ethical subjectivity from a purely moral, or moral-
psychological, register into an ontological register, that is, into a discussion of different ways or 
modes of a subject’s being. (Though I take Foucault’s position to be prima facie plausible, my aim is 
not to defend it here, but to show where and to what end, in relation to Ricoeur’s thought, such a 
defence would be valuably undertaken.) Then the work of critique is also an ontological 
transformation, both making history intelligible to us in new ways – allowing us to see, for 
example, how the Classical Greeks engaged in acts of “subjectivation” and “desubjectivation,” 
and how they may be instructive for those of us wishing to alter our relation to, say, disciplinary 
or biopolitical norms – and making us into new sorts of subjects for which the past may provide 
newly intelligible models.  
 Admittedly, a full-blown explication of Foucault’s historiography and meta-ethics is 
beyond the scope of this essay, which is intended only to continue and open up a discussion 
between two of the most historiographically-sensitive philosophers of the last half-century. 
Nevertheless, I think it is clear that Foucault sidesteps Ricoeur’s objections to the notion of “our” 
modernity, by not making claims about the “nature” of modernity (or any other epoch), but 
rather – in Ricoeur’s language – attempting to constitute “our” modernity: passing through 
precisely the “civic dissensus” that we engage in as citizens, between historians and judges.31 In 
making explicit his “relation to contemporary reality” in the form of a critical ontology of the 
present, Foucault invites us to take up this historico-philosophical practice, which is at once 
descriptive, prescriptive, and hortatory. And I think that there is a space for this historico-
philosophical practice in Ricoeur’s reflections on history. Unsurprisingly, given Foucault’s 
dissolution of a strict divide between critique and ontology, this space overlaps both sections of 
Ricoeur’s text.  
 First of all, in the penultimate section of Memory, History, and Forgetting, Ricoeur 
explores the “ontological” dimensions of the hermeneutics of the historical condition. In fact, this 
section ends up being a dialogue with Heidegger. Certainly, the Heidegger of Being and Time is 
concerned with laying out the existential structures of the human being, in virtue of which we are 
the sorts of historical beings that we are, and in virtue of which we can understand ourselves in 
historical terms. In this task, he and Ricoeur are allied. Ricoeur takes issue, however, with 
Heidegger’s emphasis on the solitary, non-discursive dimensions of historicity. Being 
authentically historical, for Heidegger, depends upon authentic being, period. And authenticity is 
achieved through resolutely anticipating one’s death, which grants one a momentary grasp of 
one’s authentic possibilities; these possibilities are grounded, so to speak, in one’s historicity, in 
the fact that one is thrown into a world with an effective history, and to take them up 
authentically is as close to “freedom” as Heidegger will grant that we can get.  
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The issue is that, given the ultimately non-discursive, non-intersubjective criteria of 
“authenticity” that Heidegger develops, one’s historicity is completely severed from “History” as 
a discipline, and from any concrete historical understanding. For Heidegger, taking up one’s 
historicity, one’s thrownness, and one’s possibilities authentically is a matter of “repeating” the 
possibilities of the past, of the possibilities latent in one’s traditions. But, for Heidegger, there can 
be no “criticism” in this, at least not in any concrete sense. As he says, “it is only through 
traditional history that historiology [i.e. historiography] penetrates to what has-been-there [i.e. 
past existence] itself.”32 Whatever authentic “repetition” might mean to Heidegger, it will not 
receive guidance from concrete, critical historiography, and this – to Ricoeur – makes it impotent: 
From start to finish, the philosophical act, permeated with angst, emerges from 
nothingness and is dispersed in the shadows… The pairing of the authentic with the 
primordial could save it from this peril if primordiality were assigned a function other 
than that of reduplicating the allegation of authenticity. This would be the case… if by the 
historical condition one were to understand… the existential condition of the possibility of 
the entire series of discourses concerning the historical in general, in everyday life, in 
fiction, and in history.33  
It strikes me that this is precisely the sort of problem that Foucault avoids. For him, as for 
Heidegger, there are certain ways of finding our past – and, therefore, our possibilities – 
intelligible, but for Foucault, like Ricoeur, these ways are linked tightly to empirical inquiry and 
historiographical practice. Indeed, they would have to be, given that, for Foucault, this “critical” 
way of being is one that only becomes intelligible itself through a specific reading of empirical 
events such as the Enlightenment (or Classical Antiquity, or what have you): 
Actually, in this historical-philosophical practice, one has to make one’s own history, 
fabricate history, as if through fiction, in terms of how it would be traversed by the 
question of the relationships between structures of rationality which articulate true 
discourse and the mechanisms of subjugation which are linked to it. We also see that this 
question invests philosophical work, philosophical thought and the philosophical analysis 
in empirical contents…34   
It seems that Foucault’s notion of “critique” answers precisely to the problems that Ricoeur finds 
in Heidegger’s “ontological” hermeneutics of the historical condition.  
 On the other hand, the “ontological” dimensions of Foucault’s ethic may augment the 
“critical” power of Ricoeur’s thought. In Time and Narrative, still working with Koselleck’s notions 
of “space of experience” and “horizon of expectation,” Ricoeur claims that it is these categories 
that make possible a particular “Enlightenment” experience of historical time. As discussed 
earlier, it is on the basis of an accumulated space of experience that we are able to project an 
intelligible horizon of expectations, and thus to experience a coherent historical present. The 
sense of historical experience characteristic of the Enlightenment has three essential 
characteristics: first, a sense of novelty, that is, of a break with past history; second, a sense of 
historical progress, that is, a positive evaluative dimension, and; third, precisely, the availability of 
history to us, a sense of our ability to really make history. However, Ricoeur notes that, in the 20th 
century, in “our” modernity, these characteristics have undergone a sort of “decline.” The sense 
of novelty characteristic of the Enlightenment has become a sense of disconnection, that the break 
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with past history is utterly radical. Our space of expectations has been diminished. 
Simultaneously, the sense of the historical progress of humanity has shifted; history no longer 
seems to be a steady progress, but increasingly rapidly accelerated change. While history 
certainly keeps moving forward, and ever more quickly, its continued acceleration is no longer a 
sign of its progress but of its utter unavailability. History is no longer something we make, but – 
at best – something that happens to us.  And, lastly, our historical horizon of expectation is 
shrunken; we no longer have any sense of what to expect from the future, of how it might change 
or – more importantly – of how we might change it.35  
Given that, as mentioned above, the categories of “space of experience” and “horizon of 
expectation” seem isomorphic to Heidegger’s concepts of “thrownness” and “projection,” and 
that Foucault’s project gives genuine, determinate content to this structure, we ought to expect 
Foucault to have something to contribute here. And he does: it is precisely this apparently 
etiolated experience of historical time, which for Ricoeur is characteristically “modern,” that 
Foucault wants to productively appropriate. The break between past and present, which Ricoeur 
takes to undermine the projection of possibilities into the future and hence the intelligibility of 
the present, becomes the task of the archaeologist. Discerning (or perhaps even producing) what is 
different, in our present, is actually part of the practice – as we saw above – of “making one’s 
history,” though no doubt in a different sense than Marx or Hegel thought we make history. And, 
of course, if we are breaking with the past in the service of “creating oneself,” of “working on our 
selves as free beings,” then we ought not be surprised that, for Foucault, what is important is not 
the projection of a horizon of possibilities. Rather, the task of making history in accord with our 
“modern” ethos in the present undermines the continuity of the past in order to render the 
projection of possibilities problematic; by scrambling our “space of experience,” our relation to 
the future becomes experimental: 
… if we are not to settle for the affirmation or the empty dream of freedom, it seems to me 
that this historico-critical attitude must also be an experimental one. I mean that this work 
done at the limits of ourselves must, on the one hand, open up a realm of historical 
inquiry and, on the other, put itself to the test of reality, of contemporary reality, both to 
grasp the points where change is possible and desirable and to determine the precise form 
this change should take. This means that the historical ontology of ourselves must turn 
away from all projects that claim to be global or radical…36 
In the place of a Heideggerean concern with projection, discerning within that projection which 
possibilities are genuinely mine and which merely inauthentic evasions of my death, Foucault 
implies that there is a different way of being historical. Though he did not live to flesh out this 
sketch (among others), Foucault’s critical ethos is a call to be differently, in the wake of a history 
that was never as much ours, and certainly never our “ownmost,” as we would have liked it to 
be.  
 It appears Foucault escapes Ricoeur’s objections to the epistemological dimensions of 
his project, and indeed has something to offer Ricoeur, namely, a way of doing history – and of 
relating to the past – that unabashedly takes up those very aspects of contemporary reality that 
seem troublesome and tries to make them productive. But what are the stakes of this encounter; 
why does it matter? To begin addressing this question, let us see where Ricoeur takes his 
discussion of “critical hermeneutics.”  
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 For Ricoeur, there lies between critique and ontology a somber discussion of the 
differences and affinities between the judge and the historian, their different functions and 
responsibilities with respect to judgment, and in particular judgment on and of the singularity of 
historical events like the Shoah. In brief, while both rely on similar epistemic procedures for 
gathering evidence, constructing representations, and so on, they differ in that the judge is called 
upon to link responsibility to named or nameable individuals, and in doing so to judge, “once 
and for all,” by “declaring the law.” In a very real sense, these verdicts make the law; they are, to 
use the language of speech acts, both declarative and constative. The civic duty of the historian, 
on the other hand, whose judgments are never once and for all time in the sense that they are not 
constative, is to continue to amass evidence, to bring to light further explanatory factors for any 
event, in short, to keep open the space of public dissensus. Now, for Ricoeur, begins an endless 
dialectic. The judge who makes the law in proclaiming it begins “a new temporal era... for the 
person convicted, another horizon of expectation which opens up options that are envisaged later 
on under the rubrics of forgetting and forgiveness.”37 On the other hand, the finality of the law is 
always in tension with the continued work of the historian, a work which is itself constantly 
faced with the threat of transforming new evidence and explanation into exculpation.38 Between 
these two poles of judge and historian stands the citizen, the public, in whom, at any given point 
in time, more or less dissensus is fostered. For Ricoeur, motivated as he is by civic concerns, the 
duty of public deliberation, of citizen involvement in interpreting the past and moving forward in 
its light as polity, is crucial.39  
 All of this, I take it, is salutary, and compatible with Foucault’s project. The aim of 
fostering public participation through dissensus is a valuable one, and the manner in which such 
dissensus plays out at the level of the concrete policies of both individuals and corporate social 
and political bodies should not be underestimated. But it should be noted that, as ever for 
Ricoeur, the limits of critique - despite the title of “critical hermeneutics” - remain at what might 
be called the “epistemic” level. Ricoeur writes that, contra Heidegger, historiographical research 
is not inauthentic, belonging to “an order of derivation that would not be reduced to a 
progressive loss of ontological density but that would be marked by increasing determination on 
the side of epistemology.”40 There is an epistemological side, and an ontological one, and critical 
hermeneutics rests on the former. While the declaration of the law in a verdict may well 
constitute the law, its constative function is inextricable from its declarative form. The 
proclamation establishes how we are to go on applying the law, insofar as it matches the general 
principle of the law - e.g., in rough form, “Murder is illegal,” - to the specific facts, issuing in a 
judgment, e.g., “the deaths of these individuals at the hands of the State was a case of murder, 
and thus the heads of State are legally culpable.” But in each case it matches a declarative to a 
declarative; a general principle to facts. And the increasing wealth of information provided the 
continuing work of historiography is, by and large, a matter of facts, of statements in the 
impersonal declarative mood; dissensus may be fostered regarding the interpretation of the facts, 
their place in a causal chain or nexus, their explanatory relevance, etc., but all of this ultimately 
rests at the epistemic level, where we can get straight on what exactly has happened and how 
exactly we might go forward in light of it.  
  What Foucault grants us, in contrast, is a way of thinking about our relation to history 
that blurs the lines between the “epistemic” and the “ontological.” The unsettling work of 
Foucauldian history does not necessarily play out in the realm of public dissensus. Indeed, my 
contention is that it does not play out in the epistemic arena of propositions - their evidence, 
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justification, and refutation - or the declaratives expressing them at all. Though both he and 
Ricoeur are interested in the ways that critique, as an historico-philosophical practice, can alter 
our horizon of expectation, it strikes me that for Foucault, this alteration has the form of a 
profound unsettling. To the extent that Foucault is engaged in the philosophical history of 
subjectivity, of the forms it may take and the ways it may be bound to the normative structures 
that constitute it, it seems that his history speaks to us in a different sort of voice altogether. My 
wager is that in tracing the techniques and strategies by which we have been made into subjects 
of a certain sort, responsive to select authorities and receptive to particular possibilities, 
Foucault’s historiographical practice serves less to furnish us with information about the past, 
from which we might draw lessons for the future, but rather with disorienting questions: who are 
we, and who might we be?  
 It’s not clear that any sort of merely declarative statement of historical fact, or any 
process of interpretation, can provide an answer to these sorts of experimental or individuating 
questions. The upshot, I take it, is that we can engage the past - even in the context of an 
originary “belonging-to-it” - in a manner more fundamental than that of the historian, the judge, 
or even the citizen. Perhaps Ricoeur even leaves room for us to do so. All I would like to do is 
suggest that, when we try to adopt a stance toward our history that is not that of the legislator or 
her interlocutors, we may be able to free ourselves - at least a little, at least at times - from the 
historical space of experience in order to open up a new horizon of experiment for our selves.  
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